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BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, DISPUTES,
AND REGULATION

The World Trade Organization Agreement
on Telecommunications*
PHILLIP L. SPECTOR"

On February 15, 1997, negotiators representing sixty-eight countries concluded an agreement
on basic telecommunications services (known as the "GBT Agreement," for the Group on
Basic Telecommunications) under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO).' The
sixty-eight countries-which account for more than 90 percent of the estimated $600 billion
in revenues that are collected each year by worldwide telecommunications services providerspledged in varying degrees to open their markets to foreign competition. The GBT Agreement
is expected to enhance significantly competition in the provision of basic telecommunications
services, leading to simultaneous decreases in service rates and growth in revenues. Perhaps more
important than any specific commitment, the Agreement represents international acceptance of
a shift in approach to the regulation of telecommunications. In the words of one industry
analyst, "The old paradigm of monopolies confined within national frontiers is out; a new
model of cross-border competition is in. '
I. Background
Upon the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade talks in 1994, which resulted in the
formation of the WTO and the execution of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), participating nations concluded that issues concerning the liberalization of certain
service sectors-including telecommunications, financial services, and maritime services-were
*Excerpts with permission from the newsletter of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. For further
discussion of this Agreement, see the contribution on International Trade in this issue.
**Phillip L. Spector is a member of the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison in Washington,
D.C. The assistance of Dana Stanculescu, a member of the law firm of Carroll, Burdick and McDonough in San
Francisco, is gratefully acknowledged.
1.The GBT Agreement is not, in fact, an "agreement" like the other Annex IA WTO agreements (e.g.,
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures). Rather, the GBT "Agreement" is a compilation of the
schedules of the 69 GBT participants, setting out their market access commitments for basic telecommunications
services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
2. Cbeap Talk,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 17,1997, at20.
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too sector-specific to be fully addressed by the general regulatory principles set forth in the
GATS. The WTO's members agreed to develop a voluntary agreement to liberalize "trade
in telecommunications transport and networks" within the framework of the GATS. The
discussions were to conclude by April 30, 1996.
The discussions began in May 1994 and the first offers were submitted in July 1995. The
United States offered to commit itself to allowing foreign-owned service providers access to
most service sectors. The U.S. offer was contingent upon its receiving a "critical mass" of offers
by other participants to make a sufficient commitment to market access, national treatment, and
certain "pro-competitive regulatory principles." After months of discussion, and the submission
of a revised U.S. offer in February 1996, momentum for an agreement began to build; by
April, forty-seven of the fifty-three countries participating in the talks had submitted offers.
Shortly before the April 30, 1996 deadline, however, U.S. negotiators declared that the
NGBT had not reached a "critical mass" of offers of "sufficient quantity and sufficient quality"
to justify committing the United States to the liberalization measures included in its revised
offer. The United States noted that the offers then on the table did not apply to 40 percent
of worldwide telecommunications services revenues and identified, as inadequate, thirty-six of
the forty-seven offers submitted by other countries. In light of this development, the Group
on Basic Telecommunications Services, or GBT, agreed to extend the deadline for an agreement
to February 15, 1997.
Following this extension, the United States and the European Union issued a joint statement
in July 1996 expressing their intention to develop a critical mass of strong offers. Since that
statement, virtually all of the forty-seven offers on the table in April have been improved and
twenty-one additional countries, mostly developing countries, submitted offers.
II. The U.S., Japanese, and EU Offers
Effective February 9, 1998, the United States will allow service providers with up to 100 percent
direct foreign ownership to provide a full range of services, including the provision of international
and domestic voice, facsimile and data services, via wireline, wireless, satellite, and submarine
cable facilities, on both a resale and facilities-based basis. In addition, the final U.S. offer applies
to state and local regulations, as well as federal regulations, insofar as such regulations prohibit
any entity from providing telecommunications services. However, the rules of state and local
regulatory agencies vis-a-vis intrastate services will not be modified by the U.S. adoption of the
GBT Regulatory Principles because of limits on the FCC's authority to preempt such regulators
under the Communications Act of 1934. The United States excluded from its final offer certain
video services, including broadcasting and direct-to-home satellite television.
Like the United States, Japan and the fifteen EU member states have agreed to allow 100
percent foreign ownership of telecommunications service providers, subject to certain caveats.
In the case of Japan, foreign entities will not be allowed to hold more than 20 percent, in the
aggregate, of either of the principal two carriers, NTT and KDD. The EU offer contains delays
in the implementation of the requirement to permit competition against the state monopoly;
rather than doing so by January 1, 1998, Spain will retain its monopoly until December of
1998, Ireland until January 1, 2000, and Portugal and Greece until January 1, 2003.
Ill. Developing Countries
The most significant improvements in the offers placed on the table since last April came
from developing countries. While the United States, Japan, and the fifteen EU member nations
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account for 75 percent of worldwide telecommunications service revenues, a significant portion
of the expected 100 to 200 percent growth over the next ten years in such revenues is expected
to come from developing countries. U.S. negotiators and industry groups were therefore relieved
to receive offers from certain countries-including Indonesia, Malaysia, and India-that are
expected to develop substantial telecommunications service markets. In all, over thirty developing
countries committed to liberalizing market access and foreign ownership restrictions applicable
to service providers.
The offers of Eastern European nations, which have pledged liberalization from 2001 (the
Czech Republic) to 2004 (Bulgaria), and the commitments made by numerous Caribbean and
Latin American nations to substantial liberalization over the next few years were received
favorably. Mexico's increase of foreign ownership restrictions (from 30 to 49 percent) represented a significant improvement from the standpoint of U.S. negotiators.
Singapore, the Philippines, and Hong Kong made commitments to liberalize their markets,
and Korea increased its limit on foreign ownership of entities other than KT to 49 percent,
but U.S. negotiators expressed some disappointment with the offers of other Asian nations.
While the submissions of offers by Malaysia and India were noted as positive events, for
example, the levels of permissible foreign ownership pledged by both of these countries are
lower than those levels currently allowed under their respective laws.
IV. GBT Regulatory Principles
Virtually all of the parties to the GBT Agreement agreed to adopt the GBT Regulatory
Principles (which are based on a July 1995 U.S. proposal), with several countries (including
India, Malaysia, and the Philippines) adopting such commitments on a partial basis and others
(including Brazil, Venezuela, and Turkey) committing to adopting such commitments in the
future. With the conclusion of the GBT Agreement, the regulatory disciplines contained in
the GATS and the Telecommunications Annex of the GATS will apply to all telecommunications services included in WTO Members' schedules. For the sixty-five WTO Members that
have accepted them, however, the GBT Regulatory Principles provide additional discipline,
in that they require countries that have adopted them to apply such measures to major suppliers
(i.e., those suppliers that have control over essential facilities or some other form of market power)
and they address issues specifically related to the telecommunications industry. Specifically, the
GBT Regulatory Principles obligate those countries that have adopted them to comply with
the following regulatory requirements.
A.

PREVENTION OF ANTICOMPETrrIVE PRACTICES

Members are to take appropriate measures to prevent major suppliers from engaging in
anticompetitive practices, induding cross-subsidization, use of information obtained from competitors that provide such information in order to gain access to essential facilities, and withholding of technical information or other information necessary for the provision of telecommunications services.
B.

INTERCONNECTION TERMS

Members are to ensure that foreign service suppliers may interconnect with the publicswitched network: (i) in a timely fashion; (ii) under nondiscriminatory terms, conditions, and
rates; (iii) at rates that are cost-oriented, transparent, reasonable, and sufficiently unbundled
to ensure that service providers need not pay for unneeded components or facilities; and, (iv)
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at any technically feasible point. Furthermore, Members are to ensure that procedures for
interconnection are publicly available and that interconnection agreements or reference interconnection offers for each major supplier are publicly available. Finally, service providers are to
be able to refer all disputes with respect to terms, conditions, and rates for interconnection to
an independent domestic body, which must resolve such disputes within a reasonable period.
C.

UNIVERSAL SERVICE

While acknowledging each Member's right to define the kind of universal service obligation

it wishes to maintain, the regulatory principles require that such obligations are not more
burdensome than necessary to achieve its universal service goals and are administered in a

transparent, nondiscriminatory, and competitively neutral manner.
D.

LICENSING CRITERIA

Members must make publicly available all licensing criteria and the terms and conditions
of all licenses that are granted, and provide the reasons for a decision to deny a license.

E.

INDEPENDENT

REGULATORY BODY

Members must provide for a regulatory body that is separate from, and not accountable
to, any supplier. The procedures and decisions of such regulatory body must be impartial.
F.

ALLOCATION AND USE OF SCARCE RESOURCES

Procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources-including frequencies, telephone
numbers, and rights of way-shall be objective, timely, transparent, and nondiscriminatory.
As GATS commitments, the GBT Regulatory Principles can be enforced through the WTO
dispute settlement process.
V. Significance of the Agreement
The GBT Agreement has great significance for global telecom markets and telecom trade
among nations. Among the most important implications are the following.
A.

DECREASE IN RATES

The International Institute of Economics estimates that the increased competition resulting
from the GBT Agreement will reduce telecommunications bills by $1 trillion, or 4 percent of
worldwide GDP, over ten years. The FCC has stated that the GBT Agreement will contribute
to its objective to decrease international service rates by up to 80 percent over the next several
years. By eliminating monopolies, allowing resale, and otherwise enhancing competition, the
GBT Agreement will contribute to any momentum to decrease accounting rates that results
from the rules created pursuant to the FCC's settlement rates proceeding.
B.

INCREASED NEED FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

The GBT Agreement's lowering of barriers to entry-including the elimination of monopolies, commitments to allow increased foreign investment, and the adoption of the GBT Regulatory Principles-will increase the number of telecommunications service suppliers. New suppliers
will require substantial amounts of equipment to build facilities. Existing suppliers will require
increased equipment in order to provide the enhanced services that will become more important
in an increasingly competitive market. The provision of such equipment will be facilitated by
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BUSINESS TRANACTIONS, DISPUTES, AND REGULATION

221

the WTO Agreement on information technology, which was signed in March 1997 and went
into effect in July 1997.
C.

INCREASED PRIVATE FUNDING OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

Many analysts have emphasized the importance of the adoption of GBT disciplines because
of the certainty that they provide foreign investors in attracting private capital to telecommunications projects in developing countries. To date, most of the private capital funding of telecommunications infrastructure development has been through the privatization of monopoly providers.
The adoption of GBT market access commitments (i.e., commitments to end national monopolies) and of the GBT Regulatory Principles will make developing countries increasingly attractive
sites for construction of new competing telecommunications facilities financed by private lenders.
D.

MORE CROss-BORDER ALLIANCES

Because the GBT Agreement will reduce many barriers to cross-border mergers and other
forms of acquisition, while increasing the need of telecom service providers to provide global
services, it is expected to accelerate the recent trend toward cross-border telecom alliances.
E.

GLOBAL SATELLITES SERVICES

Proponents of global satellite systems believe that the GBT Agreement will greatly enhance
their ability to surmount regulatory obstacles to the provision of satellite telecommunications
services on a global basis. Forty-two countries guaranteed market access for satellite services
and facilities.
VI. Implementation of the WTO Agreement On Basic Telecommunications Services
The GBT Agreement went into force on February 5, 1998. Although the signatories had
agreed originally to implement the pact effective January 1, 1998, the implementation date
was delayed because fifteen of the signatories had not ratified the pact by November 30, 1997,
the target date established by the WTO. Further negotiations through the month of January
resulted in an agreement to implement the pact on February 5, notwithstanding the fact that
thirteen nations (as of this writing) have yet to ratify the accord-(the nations in question, which
include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Philippines, Poland, and Romania, represent 4 percent
of the global telecommunications market). The WTO agreed to extend the ratification deadline
for these countries through the end of July and decided against further postponement of the
agreement's effective date upon receiving assurances from some of these nations that they will
formally adopt the pact as soon as administrative and legislative processes allow.
VII. Additional Information on this Topic on the World Wide Web
I. WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement: <http://www.fcc.gov/ib.wto.html>.
2. Statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky-Basic Telecom Negotiations: <http://
www. ustr.gov/agreements/telecom/barshefsky.html >.
3. Market Access Commitments on Basic Telecommunication-February 17, 1997:
< http://www.wto.org/wto/press/bt- 3list.htm >.
4. Data on Telecommunications Markets Covered by the WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunication-February 17, 1997: <http://www.wto.org/wto/press/data3.htm>.
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5. The WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications-Summary with AttachmentsMarch 6, 1997: <http://www.wto.org/wto/press/summary.htm>.
6. The WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications: Informal Summary of Commitments and M.f.n. Exemptions-Overview-March 6, 1997: < http://www.wto.org/wto/
new/bt-summ3.htm>.
7. Overview of the Results of WTO Basic Telecommunications Negotiations: <http://
www.wto.org/wto/services/tel.htm>. This table is in portable document format and
requires the Adobe Reader that can be found at: <http://www.adobe.com/Acrobat/
Acrobat.html >.
8. Basic Telecommunication-Schedules of Commitments and Lists of Article II Exemption,
April 1997: <http://www.wto.org/wto/new/gbtoff.htm>.
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